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 Introduction 
 Critical thinking and argumentation are closely allied. And yet each field has 
its own derivation and antecedents, and the differences between these are fun-
damental not only to debates today about their centrality in higher education, 
but to the entire history of the relationship (in Europe at least) between thought 
and language as well. On the one hand, critical thinking is most closely allied 
to philosophy; on the other, argumentation is allied with rhetoric. The debate 
about the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric goes back to Plato and 
Aristotle. It concerns ideas, ideals, concepts, and abstract thought and logic 
in relation to philosophy and the expression of these categories in verbal and 
other forms of language. Both critical thinking and argumentation overlap in 
their territories of engagement, and both have pedagogical implications for 
learning and teaching in higher education. This chapter explores the relation-
ship, examines some examples at doctoral level (and briefly at undergraduate 
level), and puts the case for argumentation as the best focus in terms of taking 
forward practice in higher education. In doing so, it may run counter to the 
arguments in many of the chapters in this book, but the challenge presented in 
this chapter may act like the grit in the oyster. In Toulminian terms, the chal-
lenge can be rebutted or lead to a more qualified position on the role of critical 
thinking in higher education. 
 Critical thinking 
 The case for critical thinking starts with Lipman, because of his work with 
primary/elementary schoolteachers and children. The reason for starting here 
is that the fundamentals of critical and clear thinking are established at that 
point, and they prepare the ground for consideration of such approaches in 
higher education in a developmental sense. Lipman’s work concentrates on 
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thinking in education in the school, basing its approach on philosophy “when 
properly constructed and properly taught”( 2003, 3). The thinking is to be 
taught within a community of inquiry and includes critical reflection. Lipman 
is skeptical of the notion of critical thinking, however, seeing it (as I do) as 
tautological. To think clearly is to be critical; being “critical” simply adds an 
epithet that is redundant. He notices a fading away of the critical thinking 
movement in the first part of the present century. In higher education, there 
has been a lack of theoretical work on thinking in the wake of mid-century 
adherence to Piagetian approaches to cognition and cognitive development 
and the publication of neo-Piagetian and Vygotskian approaches in the 1980s. 
Lipman argues that without such theoretical or historical examination critical 
thinking’s claim to be a discipline “can hardly be persuasive” (ibid., 4). The 
present book addresses this perceived gap in theoretical work. 
 In higher education—and assuming that “thinking” is core to intellectual 
life—practice can be deemed to be “critical” if one is driven by (a) a spirit of 
inquiry and skepticism, (b) able to take criticism of one’s colleagues and other 
academics’ work as part of the fabric of intellectual exchange, and (c) is self-
critical. Half of these concepts I have taken from Lipman (2003, 16–17), while 
I have rejected others to do with “correction.” Lipman’s inclusion of catego-
ries of correction and self-correction suggests that his model of thinking and 
argumentation is too closely allied to the field of argument and thinking that 
concerns itself with fallacies. But the weakness of Lipman’s position lies in the 
foundations of his reflective model of educational practice and its overdepen-
dence on Sch ö n’s theory. If its key concepts are “inquiry, community, rational-
ity, judgement, creativity, autonomy” (2003, 19), these are at such a level of 
general acceptance as to be less than useful in distinguishing ideas—and, iron-
ically, in thinking critically in higher education. The strengths in Lipman’s 
work reside in his mission to improve the quality of thinking in schooling. 
 More substantial than the critical thinking movement to date has been the 
informal logic movement, emerging in the late 1970s, and embracing theo-
retical, practical (including how best to structure arguments), and pedagog-
ical issues. In many ways, informal logic provides a bridge between critical 
thinking and its varied application in higher education institutions on the one 
hand, and linguistic and discourse analysis on the other. Behind the informal 
logic movement is a longer tradition of classical and contemporary rhetoric, 
concerned with the  deployment of thinking in the real world in the form of 
argumentation. 
 Lipman sums up the approaches well:
 Informal logicians and rhetoricians attack the same problem from different 
directions . . . Both are examining claims to reasonableness (and therefore 
are concerned with a theory of rationality). But the informal logicians move 
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towards a new conception of reasonableness by broadening and refining the 
concept of logic, while the rhetoricians do so by examining writing that is 
not or does not appear to be formally logical, in an effort to determine what 
justification such prose may claim to being reasonable. Moreover, both 
are inclined to focus on argumentation, but the one group emphasizes the 
persuasive force of argument while the other emphasizes its logical force. 
(2003, 42) 
 Ennis (1987), suggests Lipman (ibid., 46ff), bases his approach to critical think-
ing on its power to help us decide what to “believe and do.” Lipman is cautious 
about claims of this kind, preferring to see critical thinking as providing “a 
tentative scepticism” (47) rather than a justification of a set of beliefs or tools 
for making judgments and action. But Ennis’s distinction between dispositions 
and abilities is useful in characterizing the field of critical thinking. In terms 
of dispositions, critical thinkers are concerned that their beliefs are true and 
their decisions justified; that their positions are reasonable, honest, and clear; 
and that others’ views and feelings are respected. In terms of abilities, critical 
thinkers have the skills to clarify; justify the basis for decisions; infer, both 
deductively and inductively; make suppositions; and approach problems with 
equanimity, due sequence, and propriety with regard to rhetorical strategy. 
 Paul (1987), in the same volume as the chapter by Ennis, argues that critical 
thinking involves judgment, and judgment necessitates a consideration of con-
text. Judgment, however, requires a disposition toward dialogue and dialectic. 
 Critical thinking, as a movement, has had more currency in the United States 
than the United Kingdom despite the launch of an Advanced Supplementary 
(AS) level examination for 16–17-year olds in critical thinking in the United 
Kingdom in 1999. The range of definitions tends to cluster around the notion 
of robust thinking skills, with the epithet “critical” adding an edge to the activ-
ity that suggests both meta-thinking about thinking and the deployment of 
philosophical analytical processes to the discussion of propositions and evi-
dence. When characterized as a “movement” rather than a discipline or subject, 
critical thinking can be seen as a loose federation of pedagogical approaches 
designed not only to improve the quality of thinking generically, but also to 
raise awareness about the construction of discipline-based or subject-based 
knowledge. What is of concern with the movement, particularly as far as its 
application in higher education is concerned, is the lack of sharp focus as to its 
parameters, the lack of agreement about its internal definitions, and the lack of 
curricular space in higher education to deploy its insights effectively. 
 Kuhn (2005) is particularly critical of the broad and overdefined (and thus 
unclear) nature of the critical thinking movement, preferring to base her own 
work on empirical evidence (as opposed to most of the work on critical think-
ing); on cognitive development (often not addressed in higher education); and 
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on life outside the school classroom. She divides her attention between the 
two elements necessary for more socially based thinking in and outside formal 
schooling and higher education: skills of inquiry and skills of argument. 
 A key issue for higher education is therefore: What is the balance between 
epistemological discipline-based enquiry on the one hand and generic critical 
thinking education on the other? I will return to this topic toward the end 
of this chapter in revisiting some of the findings of a study of undergradu-
ate argumentation, undertaken at the University of York in the mid-2000s. 
In this study (reported in Andrews, Torgerson, Low, McGuinn, and Robinson 
2006a; Andrews, Torgerson, Robinson, See, Mitchell, Peake, Prior, and Bilbro 
2006b) aspects of the relationship between critical thinking and argument 
were explored. The focus on argumentational skills enables a return to the 
main focus of this chapter. 
 Argumentation 
 Argumentation—the more technical and process-based term than the more 
general “argument”—has a number of antecedents—mostly in the form of the-
ories or disciplines. Among these are dialogism, discourse theory, linguistics, 
logic (especially informal logic), pragma-dialectics, speech act theory, commu-
nication theory, and classical and contemporary rhetoric. Such an eclectic ped-
igree may be due to the fact that argumentation is seen as central to everyday 
interaction as well as to local, national, and international politics. It is not pos-
sible in the confines of this chapter to give a full account of the derivation of 
argumentational practice in the light of all these theories and disciplines. I will 
focus particularly on the rhetorical dimensions of argument for the purposes 
of this chapter, as both classical and contemporary rhetoric have a theoretical 
as well as a practical application. Furthermore, in terms of the relationship 
with critical thinking, rhetoric provides a useful counterbalancing set of theo-
ries and practices. The present section will focus first on the practical aspects 
of argumentation in higher education, then come back to theoretical concerns 
via a look at rhetoric. 
 Argumentation is indubitably connected with higher education in that the 
most successful undergraduates tend to be those who can argue well, in speech 
and/or writing, whatever their discipline. Argumentation is assessable, and it 
increasingly appears in criteria for success at the highest levels of undergradu-
ation. It is even more integral to masters or doctoral level work, often (now) 
appearing explicitly as a criterion for success. At the doctoral level, one could 
say that the thesis  is the argument, and vice-versa; but the same is true, to 
different degrees, for masters and undergraduate assignments (and we must 
not forget that most undergraduate and masters degrees see the dissertation or 
report as the summation of study, with a significant proportion of the marks 
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attributed to this final piece of work). At all levels, discipline-dependence 
(“field-dependence” in Toulminian terms) is a significant factor and needs 
to be balanced with generic argumentational skills (“field-independence”). 
Such a balance is the basic position taken in  Argumentation in Higher Education 
(Andrews 2009a). 
 Why is argumentation so important to higher education? It is about articula-
tion in both senses of that word: both the  expression of ideas, thoughts, feelings, 
and suppositions; the  joining together of these ideas and notions in logical and 
quasi-logical sequences, supported (usually and beneficially) by evidence; and 
also the  positioning of the student in relation to existing bodies of knowledge. 
 For the purposes of this section, I will concentrate on the doctoral thesis or 
dissertation, as work on argument in a range of undergraduate disciplines has 
been addressed elsewhere (Andrews 2002; 2009a; 2009b) and will be returned 
to in the final section. Work on masters-level argumentation has been addressed 
elsewhere (Andrews 2007). 
 Arguments emerge gradually in doctoral work. A student will first have a 
hunch that he or she wishes to do research in a particular field. The search 
then takes place, via the reading of existing literature as well as observation 
through experience and/or thought, for a problem. From the problem emerges 
either a research question (or set of related questions) and/or a hypothesis. 
Once a clear starting point has been established, and taking into account the 
flexibility needed in adjusting the question or hypothesis, the literature search 
is mapped and undertaken, the methodology and methods decided upon and 
piloted, and the work begins of creating a pathway through the field. It is this 
pathway that in due course becomes the argument. 
 One of the most critical decisions in composing a thesis or dissertation at 
this level is the structure of the piece. Is it to be linear (the conventional form) 
with an introduction followed by literature review chapters, followed by meth-
odological considerations, and in due course by results, discussion, and conclu-
sions? If so, what differences are there between the arts, humanities, and social 
sciences with regard to conventional linear structures? I have seen theses that 
follow this classic social science structure. But I have also seen examples of 
theses that are more narrative and autobiographical in nature; that follow the 
introduction with a brief methodological discussion; that do not follow the 
classic structure at all, but take a philosophical or at least reflective excursion 
through a field; that do not have “results” as such; that are more like the struc-
ture of Sterne’s  Tristram Shandy (Sterne 1759–67), a work published over several 
years with a combination of narratives, poems, illustrations, blank pages, and 
conventional academic argumentational text. Some of these theses translate 
readily into book form; others (perhaps the conventional model) do not. And 
yet linear structure is critical to the argument ( post hoc ergo propter hoc ), and, 
one could say, it is only proper that the supervisor advise the student on how 
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best to meet the expectations and regulations and criteria of the university in 
which the thesis is being created. The only thesis I have ever recommended 
for failure, even at second attempt (there was no second attempt) had no such 
rationale for a structure of any kind: it was an assortment, a  bricolage , a series of 
unconnected notes that could not justify itself, even in a postmodern sense, as 
having any kind of unity of argument, try as hard as the other examiner and I 
did to make connections between the various elements. 
 The elements of argument embedded within the conventional thesis are 
similar to those of classical rhetoric, the function of which was to ensure the 
quality of public oratory and debate in democratic society. The expectation is 
that there will be an introduction; a narration of the existing state of knowl-
edge; a means by which that knowledge can be tested via empirical data gath-
ering and analysis, and/or via reflection; a discussion of the state of existing 
knowledge in relation to new knowledge created; and a conclusion that looks 
back at the starting point of the research, and then forward to future research, 
and to applications of the research in policy and practice. But the argument 
does not emerge until the researcher is well into the process of research. Once 
its lineaments become clearer, it affords structure and direction to the thesis. 
By the time the thesis is submitted, and in the viva voce examination that 
follows, the argument should be clear, defensible, open to question, and well 
supported by evidence and/or logical or quasi-logical reflection. 
 What happens to argument and argumentation when the thesis moves away 
from linearity toward a more hypertextual, spatial, and generally  nonlinear for-
mat? The creation and submission of alternative forms of thesis, like a website, 
an art installation, a film—forms which are becoming increasingly common, 
partly as a result of the digitization of the doctoral research process and prod-
uct (see Andrews, Borg, Boyd Davis, Domingo, and England 2012)—present 
interesting challenges to the student, supervisor, and examiner in terms of 
where the argument sits. If the argument is central to the thesis in the arts, 
humanities, and social sciences in the European humanistic tradition, where 
is it in a digitized work like a website? First, it should be acknowledged that 
such alternative forms of submission for the award of PhD tend to hedge their 
bets by insisting that the “creative’ component” is accompanied by a criti-
cal commentary in writing of about half the length of a conventional thesis, 
and representing about half of the submission itself. Thus an exhibition of 
paintings or sculptures, a website, or a film would be usually accompanied 
by a 40–50,000 word catalogue or critical commentary where the argument 
could be explicitly stated. But we also have to acknowledge that the creative 
work itself embodies an argument. Let us take a website submission, for exam-
ple. It might include various sections that are hypertextually related, and all 
accessible from the front page. These sections might include still and moving 
images and sound files, hypertextual links to other sites and sources, as well 
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as conventional argumentational and nonconventional written text (remem-
ber  Tristram Shandy ). The key point as far as argumentation is concerned is 
that there is no linear sequence in which one is expected to read the doctoral 
submission. You can “enter” at any of a number of points; you can read the 
various elements and sections in any order; and you can construct your own 
arguments, as a reader, that may or may not reflect the implicit or explicit 
arguments of the composer. An example of such a work is by Milsom (2008) in 
which the opening page of the submission is a photograph of the researcher’s 
desk (see also Milsom 2012). The photograph is interactive in that the drawers, 
folders, books, notebook, computer, Post-It notes, etc. are points via which one 
can access the various elements that make up the submission. 
 Panning out from these practicalities of constructing arguments for the doc-
toral thesis, what are the rhetorical considerations relevant to argumentation 
in higher education? While rhetoric for Aristotle was defined as the  art of per-
suasion , contemporary rhetoric concerns itself more broadly with the  arts of 
discourse , and is applicable in a wide array of situations, from the personal to 
the political, and in a range of modes and media. It basically answers the ques-
tions: Who is communicating to whom? What about? What are the available 
means (modes and media) of communication? Which are best used, in which 
combinations, to ensure successful communication? How is that communica-
tion effected? It embraces many of the considerations listed above in the open-
ing paragraph: dialectics and pragma-dialectics, dialogism, speech act theory, 
linguistics, and discourse theory. What it does not tend to do, and where the 
link with critical thinking will be explored later in the chapter, is to ask  why 
such communicative exchanges are undertaken. 
 In the examination of the doctoral thesis, in the United Kingdom at least, 
the genre (in the sense of genre as social action, not as text type—see Miller 
1984) concerns the presentation of a work, either in conventional format or 
within the regulations of the particular university, and a discussion between 
the examiners and the candidate (with sometimes the supervisor present as a 
silent witness) of that work. The examiners are usually asked to submit inde-
pendent reports, giving a provisional judgment on the submitted work, prior 
to the  viva , and which they exchange in order to see to what degree their 
views are similar or different. They then conduct the discussion accordingly. 
All the power rests with the examiners—especially the external examiner, 
who, besides judging the work itself, is judging the standards of the institu-
tion itself. The “external,” therefore, has the more powerful voice in the final 
outcome. In rhetorical terms, then, we have a submitted work on the table 
where the argument is put explicitly, or somewhere on a spectrum from the 
implicit to the explicit; the researcher is there to defend both his or her deci-
sions in the process of undertaking the work, and the product itself; he or she 
does so by adding to the written submission with verbal (oral) commentary 
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and responses to the examiners’ questions. The whole is framed by the cri-
teria for the award of a doctorate at the institution in question, as well as by 
the experience of the examiners in seeing other such works recommended 
for a “pass,” both in the present institution, and in others. There are other 
hidden criteria at play: the elegance of the submission, the appropriateness 
of the researcher joining the “community” of those with a doctoral degree; 
and sometimes (unfairly, often) the prejudices of the examiners for particular 
kinds of work they wish to see exhibited (e.g., preference for a particular meth-
odology or research paradigm; the degree to which they see required correc-
tions as minor or major amendments). The criteria for the award of a doctorate 
always include some reference to argumentation: a “clear line of argument” or 
“a coherent and critical argument, well supported by evidence and/or logic,” 
for example. If a candidate can see that argumentation is critical to success, it 
usually does not matter that the examiners may agree or disagree with his or 
her argument; the path to success is to argue well, both in the presented text 
and in the  viva . Where theses are likely to fail or be referred for further work, 
the argument is either nonexistent, flawed or half-baked; and the questions of 
the examiners in this respect are unanswered or answered badly. 
 The rhetoric of the thesis and of the  viva , then, is part ritual, part a genuine 
attempt by the examiners to elicit the argument put forward by the candidate 
for the award. Understanding the rhetorical context is important for the super-
visor and candidate. For example, colleagues and I have noticed a tendency in 
theses in education and the social sciences over the last ten years or so to have 
increasingly large sections on methodology, and increasingly small sections on 
theory, perhaps reflecting tendency to validate generic methodological compe-
tence at the end of a period of doctoral study rather than, say, grasp of a particu-
lar field. Candidates must be able to defend their thesis by understanding where 
the examiners are “coming from,” that is, what ideologies and values and past 
experience, expertise, and interests they are bringing to the inevitably intersub-
jective nature of the examination. Candidates also need to understand that an 
immediate and unqualified pass at doctoral level is being increasingly replaced 
by a desire, on the part of examiners, to treat the thesis like a draft book, and 
to suggest amendments, corrections, and other improvements—within the con-
fines of the regulations and options open to them as examiners. In the United 
Kingdom, at least, the PhD  viva is becoming more like a very unbalanced peer-
review occasion. Very few candidates ever “fail,” but minor corrections and more 
substantial amendments, including referrals for further work, are increasingly 
 de rigueur . The social and political framing of the event is rhetorically informed, 
and the arguments within it are influenced accordingly. 
 Argument, within a theory of classical or contemporary rhetoric (Andrews 
2014), is a means by which agreement and consensus (or at least,  a way for-
ward , even if, in the case of the viva described above, the relationship between 
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the parties is unequal) are reached; a form of discourse in which excellence is 
expected at the summation of degree courses; a process which is undertaken in 
a range of modes and media; and a process in which difference is explored in 
order to, in due course, clarify positions and reach consensus for action. 
 Critical thinking and argumentation 
 Much of the work on bringing together critical thinking and argumentation has 
already been done by Walton (2008); indeed, the term “critical argumentation” 
in the preface to the second edition of  Informal Logic indicates the nature of the 
relationship. “Informal” indicates a grounding of arguments “as they occur in 
natural language in the real marketplace of persuasion on controversial issues 
in politics, law, science, and all aspects of daily life” (2008, xi)—hence the 
subtitle of the book: “A Pragmatic Approach.” Such an approach sets argumen-
tation within a dialogic frame, assuming that “the concept of question-reply 
dialogue as a form of interaction between two participants, each represent-
ing one side of an argument” (2008, xii) is fundamental to the study of argu-
mentation in society. The notion of  informal logic has suggested groundedness 
in specific contexts, rather than informality per se; the aim has continued 
to be identification of general patterns of logic in everyday argumentational 
discourse. As Walton notes, “what is happening now could be described as 
a movement from informal logic to semi-formal logic” (2008, xiii)—in other 
words, the gradual identification of laws and patterns in argumentation that 
are emerging in fields as diverse as computing, linguistics, discourse analy-
sis, and dialectics. Informal logic and argumentation are steadily establishing 
themselves as more reliable and coherent tools for the examination of dialogic 
exchange in everyday life and in academia. 
 One particular context for critical argumentation is higher education. In a 
study undertaken with co-researchers at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Queen Mary, University of London, and the University of York 
(Andrews et al. 2006a; Andrews et al. 2006b) and later written up (Andrews 
2009a) as part of a book on argumentation in higher education, investigation 
was undertaken into first-year argumentation in three disciplines: biology, 
electrical engineering, history, with subsequent research on educational stud-
ies. My own reflections on the project are influenced by reading in rhetoric 
and argumentation; reading on research in writing development in schools; 
and experience of teaching within the US and UK higher education systems. 
 Essentially, the development of argumentational skills in higher education 
appears to be based on the combination of a number of key elements:
 1.  a  disposition on the part of students to be “critical,” that is to weigh up dif-
ferent points of view; to be able to separate claims and propositions from 
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evidence; to question received assumptions; to hold a skeptical attitude 
toward “facts” and assumptions, 
 2.  a  disposition on the part of university lecturers and professors to accept and 
promote such a critical approach, 
 3.  a  knowledge of some of the theories and models of argumentation that have 
application in a generic sense, 
 4.  an  awareness of the way argument is manifested and structures the nature of 
particular disciplines, 
 5.  the disposition, on the part of lecturers and students, to  “drill down at the 
points of dispute” within a discipline where knowledge is contested, and 
 6.  an understanding on the part of lecturers and students that  development 
of such argumentational skills is expected within the period of study for a 
degree, and if not formed at the start, will go through a number of stages. 
 A disposition to be critical 
 Criticality in students’ work is highly prized, and even if it is not mentioned 
in criteria for the grading of undergraduate essays, masters assignments and 
dissertations, and doctoral theses, is always a hidden criterion in the judgment 
of excellence and—for many students—a key distinguishing feature between 
work that is mediocre and work that is rated as very good and above. To be criti-
cal means drawing on the largely European tradition of  critique : being driven 
by “suspicion” and skepticism rather than by obedience or deference to the 
presented truth; weighing up validity claims against each other; testing the 
warrants that hold together claims/propositions on the one hand, and data 
and evidence on the other; and developing a critical stance or position, which 
often emerges after a great deal of reading and reflection in the field or on the 
topic. None of these features are easy options for students to take. They require 
independent thought and hard work in reading and research. 
 Lecturers’ disposition to celebrate the critical 
 Many lecturers in higher education do not accept that their positions can be 
criticized; that their take on knowledge is partial; or that their authority in the 
lecture hall or seminar room can be questioned. And yet teaching a critical 
approach, and celebrating the critical spirit, requires humility with regard to 
one’s own knowledge and a sense that it could be improved by the application of 
criticality. Such an open approach to the fostering of criticality requires knowl-
edge to be seen as provisional; expertise as always emergent; and student voices 
to be heard in the discussion and debate of key topics in the field or discipline. 
 Knowledge of key theories and models of argumentation 
 To argue well, it is helpful to know how argument is constructed. There is no 
single model to fulfill this need, and attempts to apply or adapt Aristotelian 
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and other forms of classical rhetoric to the needs of the modern student only 
offer partial success. For example, it is helpful to know that arguments are 
composed of constituent parts; that these parts can be arranged in different 
sequences (there is no agreement in classical rhetoric as to how many); that 
proposition must be linked to evidence (“statement” to “proof”); and that 
weaker parts of the argument should be positioned in the middle of the essay 
or speech. But the classical emphasis on the character of the speaker, on feel-
ing, and on persuasion in an oral public forum are not always transferable to 
the seminar presentation or the essay/dissertation. Classical rhetoric needs to 
be complemented by twentieth- and twenty-first-century thinking on argu-
mentation, like that of Toulmin (1958), Yoshimi (2004), and Kaufer and Geisler 
(1991), each of whose models offers something to students at different stages in 
the composition of an argument (Andrews 2005). 
 Awareness of the way argument manifests itself in 
different disciplines 
 There may be generic skills in argumentation that are helpful to teach and 
learn, but the subject- or discipline-specific elements of argument are likely 
to be of more immediate interest to the student of a particular discipline. We 
could say that it is the very nature of disciplines to create parameters within 
which argumentation of a particular kind is undertaken: where the disputes 
in the field are played out. For example, what does it take to argue as a stu-
dent of an undergraduate degree in History, as opposed to one in Literature, 
Biology, or Engineering? Arguments in History may drill down at the points of 
dispute in the field; they may move from tertiary evidence to secondary and 
then primary evidence; in many ways argument is the sine qua non of History. 
Literature study is different in that arguments are more inductive and lead to 
appreciation and interpretation. In Biology, at undergraduate level, arguments 
are less likely to emerge as core to a study of the discipline unless there are 
sociopolitical dimensions of biology that are addressed; and in Engineering, 
the argument can be made in at least two forms: one, in the design of a prod-
uct, and other in the presentation and justification of that product design to 
an audience. 
 Drilling down at the point of dispute 
 It was mentioned in the paragraph above that historians “drill down at the 
points of dispute” to explore the arguments in the field. But there are such 
points of dispute in all disciplines in higher education. While knowledge 
may be presented as noncontroversial in some early stages in the study of 
a subject, all disciplines provide space for the discussion of key problems. 
Undergraduate students who do not locate these points of dispute tend to see 
the field as unproblematic and tend to write middle-ranging essays that are 
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more expository than argumentational. To achieve higher recognition in work 
at undergraduate, masters, and doctoral levels, the points of dispute—and their 
precise delineation—must be discovered. Then the student must have the cour-
age and know-how to “drill down” to understand and reveal, if not necessarily 
solve, the disputes. Such drilling down always opens up ground for discussion 
and argumentation. 
 The development of argument skills during a degree 
 Becoming a critical thinker as an undergraduate is a matter of development. It 
is not expected that all undergraduates, at the start of their studies, have fully 
formed argumentational skills in their chosen fields. Those who start with an 
understanding of and skills in argumentation are at an advantage; they will 
hone their skills through discussion, feedback from tutors, and through their 
ability to manage complex aspects of a discipline with agility and depth. But 
many students will arrive at the beginning of a course of study without such 
highly developed skills. It is the aim of many undergraduate courses to equip 
students to be able to argue well. To be a historian, for example, you need to 
be able to think and argue like a historian. To then undertake a masters in the 
field, you need to attain “mastery”; and to undertake doctoral work, you will 
be expected to contribute to the field itself. Each stage of undergraduate and 
graduate education requires a further improvement in argumentation skill and 
capability. 
 Conclusion 
 We conclude that one way to encourage critical thinking in higher education is 
through an increased focus on argumentation. Argumentation implies critical-
ity; the one cannot function without the other. But thinking, as those in the 
field suggest, can take various forms, from critical thinking to creative think-
ing, from naturally occurring cognitive development to productive thinking 
(see Moseley, Baumfield, Elliott, Gregson, Higgins, Miller, and Newton 2005). 
To provide the epithet “critical” to thinking processes and procedures appears 
tautological, unless one wishes to distinguish such different kinds of thinking. 
But the categorization of the range of ways of thinking has not been the prin-
cipal driver behind the critical thinking movement. Rather, the movement has 
identified generic thinking skills that have been separated from context and 
taught as an abstract mode of operation. 
 Recent studies in argumentation, on the other hand, have acknowledged 
that generic argumentational skills can only provide a framework, and that 
discipline-specific argumentation in higher education is an essential counter-
weight to the more general approach. The advantage of taking an argumenta-
tional perspective, rather than one on critical thinking, is that argumentation 
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can be concretized; it has a variety of models that can be applied to writing, 
speaking, and composing; it manifests itself in one or a number of modes; and 
there are distinct ways in which argued positions can be challenged. 
 If the aim of a focus on thinking and argumentation is to help students to 
sharpen the focus of their studies and to improve the quality of their engage-
ment in speech, writing, and other modes, then the provision of short courses 
in argumentation at the beginning and toward the end of their studies, supple-
mented by in-depth exploration of how their chosen disciplines work, would 
seem the best way forward. Ultimately, the provision of such generic and dis-
cipline-specific argumentational strands will produce students who, once they 
graduate, are able to think clearly, argue well, and take their place in a demo-
cratic society where difference is tolerated, understood, and, where possible, 
resolved to allow consensus and action. If they progress to further study at 
postgraduate level, the aim becomes one in which a deep and synoptic under-
standing of complexity in a chosen field and topic is attained, coupled with a 
coherent argument that is able to present and defend such complexity in acces-
sible and contestable terms. 
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